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Abstract: In this essay, I suggest that Spinoza acknowledges a distinction between 
formal reality that is infinite and timelessly eternal and formal reality that is 
non-infinite (i.  e., finite or indefinite) and non-eternal (i.  e., enduring). I also 
argue that if, in Spinoza’s system, only intelligible causation is genuine causa-
tion, then infinite, timelessly eternal formal reality cannot cause non-infinite, 
non-eternal formal reality. A denial of eternal-durational causation generates a 
puzzle, however: if no enduring thing – not even the sempiternal, indefinite indi-
vidual composed of all finite, enduring things – is caused by the infinite, eternal 
substance, then how can Spinoza consistently hold that the one infinite, eternal 
substance is the cause of all things and that all things are modes of that sub-
stance? At the end of this essay, I sketch how Spinoza could deny eternal-dura-
tional causation while still holding that an infinite, eternal God is the cause of 
all things and that all things are modes. I develop the interpretation more in the 
companion essay.1 
1  Introduction 
Spinoza argues that God, the one and only substance, is infinite and eternal 
(E1p11, E1p19).2 He also argues that God is the immanent cause of the essence 
and existence of all things (E1p18, E1p25). But, as Leibniz was perhaps the first to 
1 In “Spinoza’s Monism II,” in the next issue of this journal.
2 According to Descartes, God’s existence is an eternal truth (AT I.150); Descartes is not just 
claiming that it is always true that God exists, but also saying something about how God’s very 
existence is to be understood. For the purposes of this essay, I will assume that despite disa-
greeing on other issues, Spinoza agrees with Descartes that God’s reality, properly conceived, is 
timelessly eternal, immutable, and infinite (for other readings according to which God’s reality 
is eternal rather than sempiternal, see Hardin 1978, Steinberg 1981, Nadler 2006, and Schmaltz 
2015).
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point out, it is not clear, given other theses in Ethics Part I, how God is the cause of 
all things.3 First, what follows either directly or indirectly from the divine nature 
is also infinite and eternal (E1p21–23); it seems an infinite, eternal God’s effects 
are limited to what is infinite and eternal.4 Second, finite things depend on the 
causal activity of other finite things: a thing with “finite and determinate exist-
ence” causally depends on other things with finite and determinate existence, 
which in turn causally depend on other things with finite and determinate exist-
ence, and so on, in infinitum (E1p28). The question is whether Spinoza’s system is 
coherent. If an infinite, eternal God causes only what is infinite and eternal, how 
does God cause anything that is finite and non-eternal? How is God the cause of 
all things, and not just the cause of infinite, eternal things?5
According to most interpreters, Spinoza has the resources to explain how 
an infinite, eternal substance causes the finite, non-eternal things described in 
E1p28. Proposals tend to take one of the following two basic forms. According to 
one kind of account, Spinoza’s claim that an infinite and eternal God is the cause 
of all things should not be taken as the claim that God’s activity is sufficient to 
cause all things: while God, an infinite and eternal substance, is the sufficient 
cause of the necessary, universal features of nature described by laws of nature, 
a finite thing only comes to be (and be determined to produce effects) given these 
3 See Leibniz’s comments on Wachter 1999, 70.
4 E1p21 explicitly concerns modes that are infinite and eternal, while E1p22–23 explicitly con-
cern modes that are infinite and exist necessarily, a shift that an anonymous referee suggested 
indicates that only the entities in E1p21 are supposed to be eternal. I think the shift is merely 
terminological; all the “infinite modes” are eternal. In the immediately preceding propositions 
(E1p19 and E1p20), Spinoza uses E1def8 (according to which “eternity” is “existence itself” inso-
far as it follows necessarily from the divine nature) to translate talk of God’s necessary existence 
into talk of God’s existence as something eternal (cf. E1p10s, where Spinoza says that attributes 
express necessity, sive eternity, and E2p44c2, where Spinoza argues that to conceive something 
under a species of eternity is to conceive it as necessary.). Although the propositions E1p21–23 
concern what follows from the divine nature and not the divine nature itself, it is plausible that 
what “exists necessarily” in E1p22–23. can also be understood as what exists, or is real, as some-
thing eternal. Indeed, in E1p23d Spinoza takes what is infinite and exists necessarily to be at least 
coextensive with what is infinite and eternal: there, the entities in E1p21 that had hitherto been 
described as “eternal” are presented as “existing necessarily” (cf. the 1677 Dutch translation of 
the Ethics, in which both E1p21 and E1p22 concern infinite modes that are “eternal”; E1p23d 
describes the modes in both propositions as “existing necessarily”). For more discussion of these 
propositions and their demonstrations, see Primus 2019.
5 Leibniz had other objections to Spinoza. For recent discussion of other important objections, 
see Laerke 2017.
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universal features and other finite things.6 According to a more common kind of 
account, the entire causal nexus of all “things with finite and determinate exist-
ence” is identified as one of the “infinite modes,” the entities discussed in E1p21–
23.7 An infinite and eternal substance cannot cause a finite, non-eternal thing in 
isolation, but an infinite and eternal substance causes finite, non-eternal things 
by causing an infinite, everlasting mode that is the transitive causal system of all 
finite, non-eternal things.8
I will not examine versions of each kind of interpretation or canvas the philo-
sophical or textual difficulties specific to each; such discussions can already be 
found in the literature.9 Instead, in this essay, I will challenge an assumption 
common to both kinds of interpretation: viz., that Spinoza’s infinite, eternal sub-
stance can cause something enduringly real, provided that that something is 1) 
everlasting and 2) not finite.10 On the first kind of interpretation, the threat of 
inconsistency is defused by invoking sempiternal, universal effects: God causes 
finite things by causing the fundamental structures of reality that are necessary 
for finite things to cause other finite things. Here God, an infinite, eternal sub-
stance, has effects that are operative in the enduring world and so enjoy a kind of 
reality that can – unlike substance’s reality – be explicated by duration or time. 
The second kind of interpretation relies on a different “infinite mode” that can 
be explicated by duration or time: God causes finite things by causing an infinite 
mode that is the entire transitive causal system of all finite, enduring things.
That Spinoza thinks there is a causal bridge from the infinite, eternal sub-
stance to finite, enduring things is a natural enough assumption. Indeed, one 
might hold that any proposal according to which there is not a causal bridge is a 
non-starter: Spinoza calls finite, enduring things “modes” (e.  g., E1p25c) and all 
modes are in, conceived through, and somehow caused by the infinite, eternal 
substance. Furthermore, there are texts that seem to concern eternal-durational 
causation. For example, E1p21 is sometimes read as saying that God has sempiter-
nal effects, effects which must “always [semper]” exist. The demonstration posits, 
6 Curley 1969, 1988, and 1990. Cf. Watt 1972 and Yovel 1989, 157–59, and 1991.
7 The view that there is an “infinite mode” constituted by all things with finite and determinate 
existence is ubiquitous. For a small sample, see Gueroult 1968/1974, 1.312  f., Della Rocca 1996, 174 
n14, and Melamed 2013, 131.
8 D. Garrett 1991 (cf. Lennox 1976, Friedman 1986). Schmaltz 1997 has a subtly different view 
according to which the key infinite mode is an infinite, sempiternal whole that is prior in being 
and essence to finite things (cf. Nadler 2012 and Scribano 2008).
9 For an overview and bibliography, see Newlands 2018.
10 Melamed 2013, 121–26; Grey 2014, 458; A. Garrett 2003, 40–42; Lin 2012, 436; Garber 2015, 517; 
Schmaltz 2015.
4   Kristin Primus
for reductio, that “God’s idea in thought” has but a “determinate existence, or 
duration.” The point seems to be that the durational existence cannot be limited: 
God’s idea “must always exist,” or be a sempiternal “infinite mode.”11
Yet, as I hope to show, there are also reasons to think that there might not be 
a causal bridge from God, conceived as eternal and infinite, to the non-eternal, 
non-infinite things of E1p28.12
I begin by discussing E2p8–9. I argue that in this stretch of text, Spinoza 
argues that an idea of a thing t does not simply represent t as formally real; what 
is also represented is whether t enjoys formal reality that is infinite and eternal 
or formal reality that is non-infinite and non-eternal.13 There are, as it were, 
two “flavors” of formal reality in Spinoza’s system. I then take a broader view in 
Section 3, arguing that if we think Spinoza is committed to the intelligibility of 
divine causation (and the inherence of effects in the divine cause), we can expect 
Spinoza to reject causation between infinite, eternal formal reality and non-in-
finite, non-eternal formal reality and to hold that an infinite, eternal substance 
cannot cause anything enduring.14
But if an infinite, eternal substance cannot cause anything enduring, then 
available strategies for responding to Leibniz’s objection on Spinoza’s behalf 
will not work, since God, the infinite, eternal substance, cannot cause either 
the entire enduring world over all time or some everlasting, universal feature of 
enduring reality. I will conclude the essay by outlining an interpretation accord-
ing to which it is consistent for Spinoza to deny eternal-durational causation 
11 Curley 1969, 107, and 116; Gueroult 1968, I.309; Melamed 2013, 122–26; Wolfson 1934, I.376  f. 
See Primus 2019 for an alternative reconstruction of E1p21d.
12 Although he does not argue for the point as I do, Schnepf also puts pressure on the idea that 
we should seek such a causal link. On Schnepf’s reading, there are distinct aspects of a thing 
that call for distinct kinds of causal explanation (Schnepf 2011, 51–56). Importantly, we should 
be careful not to conflate the explanations: “an actual deduction [from God] of the concrete his-
tory of individual things is […] by principle, excluded” (Schnepf 2011, 55). Cf. Youpa, who argues 
that “insofar as a singular thing is in the common order of nature [the transitive causal series 
of E1p28], it is not in God, and insofar as it is in God, it is not in the common order of nature” 
(Youpa 2011, 324).
13 Here “formal reality” is understood in the Cartesian sense of the reality a thing enjoys in vir-
tue of being an existent thing (cf. AT VII.41  f., 102–4). Granted, Spinoza does not tend to use the 
term ‘formal reality’ (realitas formalis), preferring ‘formal being’ (esse formale) (see, e.  g., E2p5, 
E2p7s, E2p15). Spinoza does occasionally equate ‘esse’ and ‘realitas’ (see E1p9, E1p10s), so I do 
not think it is that misleading to discuss kinds of formal reality rather than kinds of formal being.
14 What I say in this essay complements Primus 2019, in which I argued that the propositions 
concerning the “infinite modes” (E1p21–23) help establish that all effects of an infinite and eter-
nal substance are infinite and eternal modes.
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while also holding that God, the infinite, eternal substance, is the cause of all 
things. I develop this interpretation further in the companion piece.
2  A Closer Look at E2p8
In this section, I suggest that a takeaway from E2p7–E2p9 is that an idea does 
not just represent a body as either existent or non-existent: an idea represents 
a body either 1) as something that exists in the way that enduring things exist, 
as enduringly formally real, or 2) as something that exists in the way that eternal 
things exist, as eternally formally real.15 A body either exists or does not exist, but 
to merely say that it exists is underspecified: does the thing exist as something 
with the reality of an eternal truth or true and immutable nature, or does it exist 
as something with the reality of a thing that came to be and is now actually endur-
ing in time?16
Consider E2p7, which introduces the “doctrine of parallelism”: “the order and 
connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.”17 I first 
want to highlight the proposition’s corollary: 
God’s [NS actual] power of thinking is equal to his actual power of acting. That is, whatever 
follows formally from God’s infinite nature follows objectively in God from his idea in the 
same order and with the same connection. (my emphasis)
15 In arguing that Spinoza distinguishes eternal, infinite formal reality from non-eternal, 
non-infinite formal reality, I will be advancing what Laerke 2017 calls a “Platonizing interpre-
tation” (other Platonizers include Bennett 1984, Delahunty 1985, Donagan 1988, Matson 1990, 
Rivaud 1905, Jarrett 2001, Martin 2008, Scribano 2008, D. Garrett 2009, Viljanen 2011 and 2014, 
Ward 2011, and Schmaltz 2015). Laerke rejects all such interpretations, instead advancing an 
“aspectual” interpretation that he argues better captures Spinoza’s monist framework. I will not 
be able to address Laerke’s proposal here; my aim in this essay and the companion essay is to 
introduce a new “Platonizing” interpretation of Spinoza’s monist framework – one that is, as will 
become clearer in the companion essay, also an acosmist interpretation.
16 Note that to say that something does not exist is also underspecified. It is one thing for some-
thing to not exist as a true and immutable nature; it is another thing for something to not exist 
now. Spinoza does not use the term ‘true and immutable nature,’ but for defense of the idea that 
the entities discussed in E1p21–23 are conceptual descendants of Cartesian true and immutable 
natures and eternal truths, see Primus 2019.
17 There is, of course, a lot of debate about Spinoza’s “parallelism” of minds and bodies. Here I 
will assume that the one and the sameness in E2p7 is the one and the sameness of a representa-
tion of a body, i.  e., an objectively real body in thought, and a formally real body in extension. 
Here there is one essence conceived under different attributes as enjoying different realities. Cf. 
Hübner 2019.
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According to E2p3, there is an idea of God’s essence and all that follows with neces-
sity from that essence. This idea of God’s essence and everything that follows from 
it is God’s infinite intellect.18 Ideas in this intellect are true: the order and connec-
tion of objectively real representations is the same as the order and connection of 
formally real ideata (E2p7).19 There is perfect agreement of a representation of a 
body B and body B itself because the objectively real body and the corresponding 
body existing outside of thought, a formally real body, are “one and the same 
thing, which is explained through different attributes” (E2p7s).20 
E2p8, which Spinoza says in the demonstration is “evident” from E2p7 and 
“is understood even more clearly” from E2p7s, is this:
The ideas of singular things, or [sive] of modes, that do not exist must be comprehended 
[comprehendi] in God’s infinite idea in the same way as the formal essences of the singular 
things, or [sive] modes, are contained [continentur] in God’s attributes.
Here is one way to understand this passage. Where E2p7 concerns ideas of existing 
things, E2p8 concerns ideas of non-existing things. In both cases, in the infinite 
intellect, there is a “parallelism” of objective reality and a formally real ideatum 
in extension: in each case, one and the same thing is conceived under different 
attributes. Just as an idea representing an existing circle and the circle existing in 
nature are one and the same thing conceived under different attributes (E2p7s), so 
18 Spinoza does not use the term “infinite intellect” in E2p3 or its demonstration, but that term 
does appear in E1p16, which is cited in E2p3d. That E2p7 relies on E2p3 has been noted by Curley 
1988, Della Rocca 1996, and Wilson 1991.
19 A true idea agrees with its object [ideato] (E1a6). There are two words Spinoza uses for the 
“object” of an idea, ‘ideatum’ and ‘objectum.’ The latter term is used more broadly, referring to 
what is objectively real, what is real outside the idea, or both. For example, when Spinoza says 
that the “object constituting the human mind is the body” (E2p13), he uses ‘objectum’: in this 
context, the point seems to be both that a human mind represents the human body (i.  e., the 
human body is objectively real in thought) and that that human body is formally real in exten-
sion. ‘Ideatum’ is used when Spinoza discusses the truth of ideas; when ideas are true, what is 
objectively real in thought is also formally real, and what is formally real is the true idea’s idea-
tum (see E1p30d, E2p43s). Here I disagree with D. Garrett, who holds that ‘ideatum’ is the broader 
notion (D. Garrett 2017, 201).
20 Cf. Descartes, AT VII.102  f. In taking the “one-and-the-sameness” of E2p7s to be the “one-
and-the-sameness” of a thing existing in thought and a thing existing outside of thought, I am 
reading Spinoza as coopting a Cartesian account of representation (cf. Hübner 2019). While E2p7 
hinges on conceiving an idea in terms of what the idea represents, the reality of ideas is not 
exhausted by objective reality, as one may also conceive the idea in terms of formal reality (E2p5, 
E2p7s). I read E2p21 as also about ideas conceived as formally real acts of thinking. I say more in 
Section 3. For more discussion see Primus 2021.
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the idea representing a non-existing circle and a non-existing circle are one and 
the same thing conceived under different attributes. The “non-existing circle” is 
a “formal essence” that is “contained” in an attribute, and this “formal essence” 
is not something that exists or is real.
However, I do not think the “parallelism” of E2p8 is between ideas of non-ex-
isting things and non-existing things. Rather, the parallelism is between ideas of 
eternally formally real essences and the eternally formally real essences. We can 
understand E2p8 as conveying the following. Because all essences following from 
the divine nature are “contained” in God’s necessarily (eternally) real attributes, 
all essences have eternal formal reality as eternal modes caused by substance.21 
(As I will explain in the next section, this eternal reality is also infinite reality, but 
here I will couch the discussion just in terms of eternal reality.) And because the 
“order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things” 
(E2p7), there are true ideas of these eternal essences “comprehended in God’s 
infinite intellect”: one and the same thing can be conceived either as an eternal 
essence in thought or as an eternal essence in extension. Even things that do not 
now exist as enduring singular things have eternally formally real essences, so in 
“God’s infinite idea,” there are true ideas of those things “that do not [now] exist 
[as enduring things].”22
The infinite intellect’s ideas represent things as existing eternally, or as 
enjoying eternal formal reality; the ideas represent the eternal things in virtue 
of the eternal things being objectively real in thought. In the corollary, Spinoza 
notes that there are also ideas representing things as enduring things:
When singular things are said to exist, not only insofar as they are comprehended in God’s 
attributes, but insofar also as they are said to have duration, their ideas also involve the 
existence through which they are said to have duration. (E2p8c)23
21 One might think that Spinoza’s saying that formal essences are “contained” in God’s attrib-
utes implies that they are not caused by God and thus do not have any formal reality; in that 
case, a formal essence is not a formally real essence. However, in E2p7s, Spinoza uses ‘formal’ 
in referring to formal reality that has a cause: the “formal being [esse formale] of the idea of the 
circle can be perceived only through another mode of thinking, as its proximate cause.” I think it 
is unlikely that Spinoza employed a different sense of ‘formal’ in E2p8 (cf. Yovel 1989, 162). Note 
too that in E1p17s, Spinoza uses “formal essence” to mean what is formally (rather than objec-
tively) real: “the truth and formal essence of things [formalis rerum essentia] is what it is because 
it exists objectively in that way in God’s intellect.”
22 Granted, taking E2p8 this way, with these interpolations, requires reading ahead to E2p8s 
and E2p9. Given E2p8’s obscurity, I think looking to the proposition’s immediate textual context 
for some help is warranted.
23 Cf. CM I.2 (G I.238  f.). It is unclear from the text whether Spinoza means that there is one 
idea of a thing that gains content when that thing is said to exist not just as an eternal essence, 
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We might read “ideas also involve the existence through which they are said to 
have duration” (my emphasis) in two ways. On one reading, the claim is that when 
a thing x has duration, there is an idea of x as enduring, and that idea involves 
or implicates the existence of the particular things q, r, s that caused the thing’s 
initial generation or help the thing endure over time.24 On another reading, the 
claim is just that when a thing has duration, there is an idea of that thing as 
continuing in its existence, and this idea does not involve or implicate other par-
ticular things q, r, s, but rather a kind of existence or formal reality which can be 
described as continuing.25
Cognition of an effect depends on and involves cognition of its cause (E1a4), 
so there is a case to be made that the idea of an enduring thing will implicate the 
causes of its becoming (and/or remaining) an enduring thing. However, I think 
the latter reading better captures the emphasis in E2p8c. Consider the illustration 
Spinoza provides in E2p8s. This scholium does not explicitly mention the causes 
of the coming to be of an enduring thing, but it does seem to underscore that 
ideas can differ in the formal reality they represent things as having: 
[…] I shall try as far as possible to illustrate the matter: the circle is of such a nature that 
the rectangles formed from the segments of all the straight lines intersecting in it are equal 
to one another. So in a circle there are contained infinitely many rectangles 
which are equal to one another. Nevertheless, none of them can be said to 
exist except insofar as the circle exists, nor also can the idea of any of these 
rectangles be said to exist except insofar as it is comprehended in the idea of 
the circle. Now of these infinitely many [rectangles] let two only, namely [those formed from 
the segments of lines] D and E, exist. Of course their ideas also exist now, not only insofar 
as they are only comprehended in the idea of the circle, but also insofar as they involve 
the existence of those rectangles. By this they are distinguished from the other ideas of the 
other rectangles. 
but also as a presently enduring thing. I am inclined to say that there are two ideas of the thing, 
one which represents the thing’s essence as something eternal and the other which represents it 
as something enduring. As Spinoza points out in E2p9, the “idea of a singular thing which actually 
exists has God for a cause not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is considered to be affected 
by another idea of a singular thing which actually exists”; the implication is that this idea’s formal 
reality does not have the same cause as the idea representing the thing as  something eternal.
24 See Laerke 2017, 30–33. See footnote 28 below.
25 Spinoza clarifies in E2def5 that ‘duration’ [duratio] means an “indefinite continuation of 
existing” (cf. Principles I 55, AT VIIIA 26). So, to “have duration” does not mean having some 
definite, or determinate, duration (i.  e., existing for some specified span of time); it is to exist 
as something that endures over time, where the measure of that endurance is not encoded in 
a thing’s essence or determined by the thing’s efficient cause (E2def5exp., cf. E3p8). I assume 
that the efficient cause in E2def5exp. is the cause of the coming to be of the thing, or the kind of 
efficient cause I take to be under discussion in E1p28.
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From the circle’s nature it follows with necessity that the circle “contains” 
infinitely many equally sized rectangles. Although Spinoza does include a 
diagram with a circle with lines inscribed within it, I do not think that at the 
beginning of E2p8s we are supposed to attend to the circle as an actually-drawn 
figure on the page. If the circle is supposed to be a stand-in for substance, it makes 
sense to conceive of the circle as existing as substance does: namely, as an eternal 
truth (E1def8exp.)  – with the caveat that unlike substance, the circle does not 
exist as an eternal truth by its own nature alone. Insofar as the circle exists as an 
eternal truth or true and immutable nature, an infinity of rectangles also exists 
as eternal truths, as propria of the circle’s essence. Analogously, from the nature 
of substance infinitely many things in infinitely many modes, i.  e., “everything 
which can fall under an infinite intellect” (E1p16), follow with necessity, and 
these are all in substance (E1p15). If substance exists as an eternal truth, then all 
the things following with necessity from that eternal truth – all the propria – also 
exist as eternal truths, eternal modes of an eternal substance.26
The ideas of the rectangles only exist insofar as there is an idea of the circle’s 
essence. Yet these ideas of the rectangles are not ideas of rectangles that have 
been constructed and now endure; the ideas of the rectangles are ideas of what 
specific geometrical natures there must be given the nature of a circle. Similarly, 
the ideas of each of the infinity of things following from substance’s nature are 
ideas of what things must be given God’s eternal attributes.
When, at some time, two equally sized rectangles are constructed from the 
lines D and E that are inscribed in an actually-drawn circle, there are ideas of 
these “actually existing” rectangles; these ideas represent the two rectangles as 
enduring things, not as eternal truths. These ideas are distinguished from the 
ideas of eternal truths in virtue of differing in the kind of reality the rectangles are 
represented to have.27
In E2p9, Spinoza turns to ideas of the causes (and effects) of finite, enduring 
things. The order and connection of finite things coming to be, enduring for a 
while, and ceasing to be is the same as the order and connection of the ideas of 
those finite things:
26 See Primus 2019 for further defense of the claim that in Spinoza’s system, everything follow-
ing from the divine nature (as in E1p16) exists as eternal truths.
27 One might suppose that an idea of an eternal formal essence is an idea representing some-
thing as possible; the idea representing the thing as enduring, or actual, is the idea of the actual-
ization of the formal essence (cf. D. Garrett 2009). On my reading of E2p8, Spinoza is not arguing 
that ideas of formal essences are ideas of things as possible: they are ideas of eternally formally 
real things, and such things are actual, or real, in the second sense of “actual” in E5p29s (i.  e., sub 
specie aeternitatis as “contained in God” and “following from the necessity of the divine nature”).
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The idea of a singular thing which actually exists [i.  e., is enduringly real] has God for a 
cause not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is considered to be affected by another 
idea of a singular thing which actually exists [i.  e., is enduringly real]; and of this [idea] God 
is also the cause, […] and so on, to infinity.
Things conceived of as eternally real cannot ever be conceived as not eternally 
real; such things are eternal modes necessarily caused by a necessarily eternal 
substance. However, things conceived as finite, enduringly real things can be 
conceived as changed (or even destroyed) by other finite, enduringly real things.28
In sum, E2p7 focuses on the one-and-the-sameness of ideas of bodies and 
bodies: there is a representational parallelism of objective reality in thought and 
formal reality in extension. E2p8 and E2p9 introduce another layer of complex-
ity.29 There is a parallelism of ideas of eternally formally real things and eternally 
formally real things, as well as a parallelism of ideas of enduringly formally real 
things and enduringly formally real things.
It has been suggested that E2p8 can help us understand how an infinite, 
eternal God causes finite, enduring things.30 From what I have said here, however, 
E2p8 and E2p9 establish that there are ideas of the formally real causal structures 
described in E1p21–23 and E1p28. How these formally realities (or ideas thereof) 
are related is not yet clear.
3  Putting Some Pressure on a Common 
Assumption
Spinoza is famously strict about what must be the case for one thing to cause 
another thing. Things that “have nothing in common with one another also 
cannot be understood through one another, or the concept of one does not involve 
the concept of the other” (E1a5). Things that cannot be understood through one 
28 While I do not think Spinoza does so in these propositions, he can account for how a mind 
represents a thing as non-existing in the sense representing a thing as not being, at some point, 
enduringly real (see, e.  g., E2p49s/G II 134). To represent something as that which did endure but 
is no longer enduring, one represents causes of that thing’s coming to be as well as causes of its 
destruction; in the absence of representations of destructive causes – but with the presence of 
representations of the thing’s coming to be – the idea will be of the thing as (now) enduring. See 
Laerke 2017, 30–33. Cf. Moreau 1994, 501.
29 There is yet another layer of complexity that I will not discuss here: the parallelism of modes 
across God’s other attributes. See Melamed 2013, ch. 5.
30 E.g., Tad Schmaltz 1997, 217  f.
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another cannot be causally related (E1p3): “cognition of an effect depends on and 
involves cognition of its cause” (E1a4). A difference in attribute precludes causa-
tion: the concept of a body does not depend on or involve the concept of thought, 
but it does depend on and involve the concept of extension; a body thus cannot 
be understood as caused by substance considered under the attribute of thought 
(E2p6, E3p2d). 
Interpreters have assumed that something enduringly real can be a mode 
immanently caused by an eternal, infinite substance, provided the enduring 
thing is “infinite” and that the substance and enduring thing are understood 
under the same attribute. In this section, I put some pressure on this assump-
tion. I will not claim that the infinite, eternal substance conceived under, say, 
the attribute of extension and some indefinite and sempiternal extended thing 
have “nothing in common” – they are both thought to enjoy reality outside the 
mind or outside of thought. I will argue, however, that there are basic features 
of the putative effect (e.  g., a transitive causal structure) that are not explained 
by the putative eternal, infinite cause. It seems that for causation (and, I 
suggest, the inherence of the effect in the cause) to be intelligible, it is not 
enough for the cause and effect to both be thinking or both be extended: cause 
and effect must also be both eternal and infinite or both non-eternal and non- 
infinite.
First consider the inter-attribute case. Substance conceived under the attrib-
ute of extension cannot cause either a thinking substance or thinking modes, 
and a body and a mind cannot causally interact. What is extended and what is 
thinking have “nothing in common,” or the “concept of the one does not involve 
the concept of the other.” While a full discussion of the attributes is well beyond 
the scope of this essay, it is worth saying a bit more about the concepts of thought 
and extension relevant to the causal prohibition.
Return once again to the example in E2p7s: the idea of a circle existing in 
nature and the circle existing in nature are one and the same thing considered 
under different attributes. An idea represents the circle existing in nature in 
virtue of the circle being objectively real in thought. Yet one and the same thing 
can be conceived in different ways within the attribute of thought, either as the 
“idea” or as the “idea of the idea” (E2p21), where the “idea of the idea” is the 
“form of the idea insofar as this is considered as a mode of thinking without rela-
tion to the objectum” (E2p21d). I think Spinoza is making a few points in E2p21. 
First, any idea can be conceived either in terms of what it represents (i.  e., in terms 
of what is objectively real) or in terms of the formal reality ideas have,  regardless 
of what is represented. To conceive of a thought “without relation to the  objectum” 
is, I take it, to conceive of it just qua act of thinking, bracketing both what is objec-
tively real (e.  g., the objectively real body) and the idea’s formally real ideatum 
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(the formally real body).31 Second, the formal reality of ideas is distinctive in that 
it makes objectively real contents (whatever they may be) present to mind.32 Third, 
and relatedly, the objectively real content, a representation, can be conceived as a 
representation. If the “idea” of the circle is the representation of a circle in nature, 
then the “idea of the idea” is the representation of the representation of a circle 
in nature; a mind can thus distinguish between the objectively real circle with 
radius R in thought and the formally real circle with radius R in extension.33
I take it that the concepts behind the ability to make this distinction are the 
concepts of extension and thought relevant to the inter-attribute causal prohibi-
tion (E1a5, E1p3, E2p6, E3p2, E5pref/II.278–80). Although an idea represents a 
body, thinking reality and extramental extended reality can be conceived inde-
pendently of the other (see E1p10s). What is real in thought is explained by what 
is also real in thought: some objectively real j is caused by another objectively real 
k; conceived in terms of formal reality, that there is an act of thinking about j is 
caused by there being acts of thinking about k.34 What is formally real in exten-
sion is explained by what is also formally real in extension. Mind-body causation 
is not intelligible, as there is no generic kind of reality common to both the reality 
of thought and the reality of extramental extension; the idea of such generic 
reality is a highly confused idea labeled by “transcendental” terms like being, 
thing, and something (E2p40s1). 
3.1  Inexplicable Shifts Between Cause and Effect
I now want to turn from the attributes case to the case of formal reality, and to 
the assumption that an eternal, infinite substance can cause what is enduringly 
real, provided that the effect is “infinite” and conceived under the same attri-
bute.
Note that whether conceived under the attribute of extension or under the 
attribute of thought, substance’s reality and the reality of the things figuring in 
E1p28 and E2p9 are structurally different. Substance’s reality is self-causing and 
absolutely necessary (E1p7). Substance is infinite by nature (E1p8), where being 
31 Cf. Descartes, AT VII 8, 40  f.
32 Cf. Descartes, VII 160.
33 The ability of a mind to distinguish an objectively real circle in thought and the formally real 
circle in extension is presupposed in E2p7s; I think this ability is explained in E2p21. For further 
discussion of E2p21, see Primus 2021.
34 An idea is adequate in a mind when it can be completely explained by other ideas within the 
same mind (see E2p11c, E2p29s, and E2p38d).
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infinite is an “absolute affirmation of the existence of some nature” (E1p8s1): sub-
stance could not have more (or less) reality than it in fact has. I think Spinoza 
would also say that it is confused to conceive of substance’s reality under any 
attribute as a maximum degree or amount of reality.35 To think in terms of degrees 
or amounts is to think in terms of units of reality, but this invites the mistaken 
thought that substance’s reality is posterior to the reality of those units, or that 
substance’s infinite reality is just indefiniteness.36 Moreover, substance’s reality 
is not to be conceived as enduring, sempiternal reality. Substance is immutable 
(E1p20c2) and an eternal truth (E1p20c1) which “cannot be explicated by dura-
tion or time, even if the duration is conceived to be without beginning or end” 
(E1def8exp.).37 
35 While Spinoza tends to treat reality (i.  e., perfection) as a gradable notion (see E5p40d), it 
is sometimes asserted that Spinoza does not treat ‘existence’ (or ‘actual’) as gradable. I think 
Spinoza’s usage is not this tidy, however. Sometimes Spinoza treats existence as not gradable: 
e.  g., in the context of arguments for the existence of God. However, in other contexts, it seems 
‘existence’ could be a synonym for gradable reality. Consider E1p8s1, where Spinoza says that 
“being infinite is an absolute affirmation of the existence [existentiae] of some nature”; being 
finite is “a negation” that involves denying “existence” to a nature. Here it seems the notion of 
the existence of a finite thing is gradable: to be finite is to be something with some existence or 
reality – something that would have more existence or reality were it not limited by other things 
(see E1d2). While it is not yet clear in E1p8s1, I think it becomes clearer later that the reality 
that is “absolutely” affirmed of a nature is not the same sort of reality that can be thought of as 
gradable.
36 Cf. Descartes, Principles  I.26 (AT VIIIA.14  f.). See also Spinoza’s discussion of “quantity as 
it is in the imagination,” which is “finite, divisible, and composed of parts” (E1p15s (G II.59)). 
Although I will use the term ‘indefinite’ as a marker, I should note that Spinoza does not tend to 
use this term (but see Letter 12 (G IV.61).
37 In E1def8, Spinoza associates what is eternal with what exists by its nature alone (where this 
nature is captured by a real definition): “by eternity I understand existence itself, insofar as it is 
conceived to follow necessarily from the definition alone of the eternal thing.” Yet I do not think 
that Spinoza means here that only what exists by nature (i.  e., substance) is eternal. As Spinoza 
will later argue, there are modes that do not exist by nature (E1p24) but are still eternal (including 
the human mind, insofar as it understands (E5p31, E5p40s)). E1def8 does not seem to me to be 
incompatible with there being modes that are eternal as ways that the “existence itself” follow-
ing from the divine nature is modified; substance exists as an eternal thing by its nature alone, 
while eternal modes of substance exist as eternal things by being immanently caused by and 
inhering in the eternal substance. While it is perhaps not made so explicit in the texts, I follow 
others in thinking that the eternity in E1def8 is timeless eternity, and in thinking that God is, for 
Spinoza as for Descartes, timelessly eternal (see footnote 2). For more defense of the idea that the 
eternity of eternal modes is also timeless eternity, see Primus 2019.
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Now consider the formal reality of enduring things.38 Whether conceived 
as extended or thinking, an enduring finite thing can be thought of as a part 
of a greater whole or itself a whole composed of parts. Enduring formal reality 
is gradable and spread out, as it were, and it is not incoherent to think of such 
reality in terms of units, including temporal units. However long a striving finite 
thing manages to actually endure can be thought of in terms of temporal parts 
and admits of temporal measure.39 The reality the thing has is limited (and limit-
ing) and can also be thought of as more or less limitable (or limiting): an enduring 
finite body can be coherently thought of as enduring for more or less time than it 
in fact does, as being bigger or smaller than it is, or as more or less powerful than 
it in fact is.40
When it comes to the series of enduring things, there are always more things 
beyond any possible imposed bound, and there is no thing one could non-arbi-
trarily designate as a “first” or “last” cause. All members of the series are such that 
each of them implicates the enduring formal reality and transitive causal activity 
of other things, and there is no enduring formally real mind or body one could 
identify as so great that one could not conceive of another that is even greater 
(E1p27  f., E1def2, E4a). The series of all enduring, finite things is infinite in the 
sense of indefinite and eternal in the sense of sempiternal. While there are direct 
or indirect transitive causal connections between all things, there is, importantly, 
38 This is the formal reality with which we human beings are most familiar. It is even an axiom 
that we “feel a certain body [NS: our body] is affected in many ways” (E2a4), where this body is 
not something infinite and necessary (E2p11d). Spinoza does not always flag when he is talk-
ing about enduring bodies or minds (but see E5p21 and E5p23d), but we can assume that when 
Spinoza discusses things that strive to persevere in being but can be affected (or destroyed) by 
other striving things, he is discussing enduring things. Such striving things have “duration” in 
the sense that they continue to exist, where this continuation is “indefinite” because the extent 
of the continuation is neither determined through “the very nature of the existing thing” or by 
the cause that brought it into being (see E2def5, E2def5expl., and E3p8). Note that Spinoza some-
times uses “duration” to mean a determinate span of existence or the measure of how long a 
thing has continued to exist (E2p30–31), even though in E2def5 he had defined duratio to mean 
an indefinite continuation of existence. E2def5 is not cited in E2p30–31 or in any other demonstra-
tion, but I suspect that “duration” in E2def5 is what shows up in Part III as striving.
39 A few points of clarification. First, different units (seconds, years) may be used in different 
contexts, and the units that are in fact used are not the only possible temporal units. Second, 
even if one is able to determine how long a finite thing has endured, and so provide a determi-
nate measure of its duration, this does not mean that the entire transitive causal series of finite 
enduring things as a whole admits of a determinate measure: that series is indefinite.
40 While I cannot discuss this more here, I agree with Hübner 2017 that the identification of 
power and essence must be qualified: it seems an enduring thing must be able to undergo at least 
some changes while remaining the thing it is.
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asymmetry in the causation: causes precede their effects, and not all things are 
real at the same time.
Are these differences enough to preclude substance, conceived as infinite 
and eternally formally real, from causing enduring formal reality, even if that 
effect is the entire transitive series of all finite things taken together or some per-
vasive, universal, and sempiternal feature of enduring reality? If the standard 
for genuine causation is intelligibility, there cannot be aspects of the effect that 
cannot be explained by the cause.41 It seems that an eternal, infinite substance’s 
causation of enduring reality – even if it is indefinite and sempiternal – does not 
meet this standard, as there are inexplicable shifts between cause and effect. 
Suppose the effect is the entire series of finite things taken as a whole, the indi-
vidual that is the whole of nature (E2lemma7s). There are features of the putative 
effect that do not seem to be explained by the cause, like an indefinite endur-
ing individual’s divisibility and transitive causal structure. “For each thing there 
must be assigned a cause or reason [causa sive ratio], as much for its existence as 
for its non-existence” (E1p11d), but here a reason or cause seems to be lacking for 
why these basic features exist. More generally, we might ask what reason there 
could be for substance, whose formal reality is atemporally eternal, to cause an 
effect whose reality can be explicated in terms of duration or time.42
It has been assumed that an infinite substance’s causation of a pervasive, 
sempiternal feature of the enduring world or the series of enduring things con-
sidered as a whole is intelligible because the effect is “infinite.” There is, the 
thought goes, no inexplicable gain or loss of reality: whatever reality there is in 
the effect can be traced to the reality of the cause, so there is no unexplained 
surplus of reality in the effect, and since the effect is infinite, there is no reality 
whose non-existence is unexplained.43
41 In E1p17s, Spinoza does write that “the thing that is the cause both of the essence and of 
the existence of some effect must differ from such an effect, both as to its essence and as to its 
existence” (G II.63). This, however, is not an articulation of his own position. First, it seems to 
contradict E1a5. Second, it is a claim asserted in an argument establishing that if we conceive 
the divine intellect (or will) to be the divine essence and the cause of all things, then we must 
conclude that the divine intellect is very different from our own intellect (or will) – a conclusion 
Spinoza later rejects (E2p11c).
42 Nadler raises, but does not answer, a similar question (see Nadler 2012, 236).
43 For Cartesians, something cannot come from nothing: for anything that is real, there is a 
cause of that reality. Spinoza agrees, but, as just mentioned, says that there must also be an 
explanation for something not being real (E1p11d). It is widely acknowledged that Spinoza rules 
out infinite-finite causation. There is not something else to limit the one and only substance’s 
causal output, and substance does not impose limits on itself (see E1p16–E1p17), so it seems sub-
stance’s effects cannot be finite modes (see E1p21–23). Substance cannot, without explanation, 
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Yet to say that the cause, substance, and effect, the enduring world or some 
feature of that enduring world, are both “infinite” elides the distinction between 
the infinite and the indefinite. Once we attend to this distinction, the idea that 
infinite-indefinite causation does not involve an inexplicable gain or loss of reality 
becomes harder to understand. The indefinite can be thought of in terms of finite 
parts, and so indefinite-indefinite causation could be understood as not involv-
ing any inexplicable gain or loss in the “amount” of reality. However, the reality 
of the infinite substance is not supposed to be thought of in terms of parts.44 In 
infinite-indefinite causation, the effect and cause are not commensurable in the 
way they are in indefinite-indefinite causation45; the claim that there is not more 
or less reality in the effect as in the cause only makes sense if the cause, like the 
effect, can be thought of in terms of parts or amounts.46
One might argue that Spinoza can accept the differences between God’s 
eternal, infinite formal reality and enduring, indefinite formal reality while still 
insisting that the former can cause the latter: God’s eternal, infinite formal reality 
can contain non-eternal, indefinite reality eminently, so God can cause enduring 
formal reality without being enduringly real himself.47
It should be noted that Spinoza elsewhere rejects appeals to eminent con-
tainment. Spinoza’s God does not cause what is extended because God contains 
extension eminently – rather, God causes extension because one of God’s attrib-
utes is extension.48 An appeal to the eminent containment of extended reality in 
God’s thinking reality is a cover for ignorance: 
cause less than it can cause, and what substance can cause is infinite. As I said at the outset of 
the paper, it is generally accepted that the infinite substance can cause what is finite, provided 
an “infinite mode” is part of the causal explanation; there is a variety of ways of spelling out 
the details, but most presuppose an “infinite mode” that is indefinite. Thanks to an anonymous 
referee for pressing me to clarify this here.
44 Cf. PPC I.19 (G I.178), CM I.6 (G I.246), CM II.1 (G I.250  f.), Ep. 50 (G IV.239).
45 In indefinite-finite causation, the putative cause and effect are commensurable, as both can 
be thought of in terms of parts or “amounts” of formal reality. Such causation is ruled out, as 
there cannot be less reality in the effect as was in the cause.
46 In Primus 2019, I suggest that Spinoza can be understood as criticizing the Cartesian idea 
that the finite (and the indefinite) could be understood as the idea of the infinite with something 
“taken away” (AT V.356).
47 See Descartes, AT VII.41, 79, 105, 135, 367.
48 Schmaltz 1999, 188, argues that extended substance is not spatially extended, but substance 
causes spatially extended things because substance contains spatial extension eminently. I 
agree with Schmaltz (and Peterman 2015) that extended substance is not spatially extended, but 
hold, with Peterman, that Spinoza would reject the eminent containment of spatial extension in 
non-spatial extension.
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Meanwhile, by other arguments […] they clearly show that they entirely remove corpore-
ality or extended substance itself from the divine nature. And they maintain that it has 
been created by God. But by what divine power could it be created? They are completely 
ignorant of that. And this shows clearly that they do not understand what they themselves 
say. (E1p15s)49
Given the differences outlined above, eternal-durational causation arguably 
raises comparable questions, making an appeal to eminent containment in this 
case as much a cover for ignorance as it is in the other case. 
3.2  The Issue of Inherence
The assumption that an infinite, eternal substance’s immanent causation of some-
thing indefinite and sempiternal is intelligible is the assumption that the inher-
ence of the effect in the cause is intelligible, or that something enjoying indefi-
nite, sempiternal reality can be understood as a way that substance’s reality is 
modified. However, it seems that to make sense of the inherence of something 
indefinite and sempiternal in the infinite, timelessly eternal substance, one either 
has to give up a straightforward understanding of what it is to enjoy formal reality 
as a mode or give up thinking of substance’s reality as infinite and timelessly 
eternal.
Here is a straightforward understanding of modes and substance. Modes 
depend for their formal reality on substance’s formal reality, but a substance 
does not depend on its modes for its formal reality. This asymmetric dependence 
distinguishes modes’ formal reality from substance’s formal reality. Neverthe-
less, what seems distinctive about the mode-substance relation is that in another 
sense, the formal reality of modes and the formal reality of their substance is the 
same formal reality. Modes are just ways the substance’s formal reality is. The 
modes of substance conceived under the attribute of extension are ways that sub-
stance’s extended formal reality is; the modes of substance conceived under the 
attribute of thought are ways that substance’s thinking formal reality is. 
The question is whether formal reality that is divisible, can be thought of as 
having parts, and is temporally spread out (with a transitive causal structure) is a 
way substance’s infinite, eternal formal reality is. If one assumes the straightfor-
ward understanding, there is some pressure to say no: insofar as formal reality is 
in time, that formal reality is not literally a way that eternal formal reality is, and 
49 Cf. KV II.19 (G I.90), CM I.2 (G I.237  f.), and Ep. 4 (G IV.14).
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insofar as the formal reality is divisible or composed of parts, it is not literally a 
way that infinite formal reality is. 
One could, of course, retort that the straightforward understanding of modes 
and substance is not Spinoza’s understanding of modes and substance. One could 
say that modes of substance need to depend on substance, but modes and their 
substance need not literally have the same formal reality.50 Perhaps some modes 
(infinite, eternal ones) are literally ways that substance’s infinite, eternal reality 
is modified, but other modes (non-infinite, non-eternal ones) are not; there are 
perhaps two distinct ways a mode can be related to substance. One kind of mode 
can be understood in the straightforward way: an infinite, eternal mode is a 
way substance’s infinite, eternal formal reality is modified. Yet the other kind of 
mode’s relation to substance is different: the other kind of mode is not literally a 
modification of substance’s infinite, eternal formal reality, but is a mode because 
it has a causal connection, perhaps via the first kind of mode, to the infinite, 
eternal substance (a causal connection which, as I suggested above, might not 
be intelligible).
If one wants to retain a straightforward understanding of all modes and sub-
stance, one could insist that substance’s formal reality is not timelessly eternal 
and infinite, but sempiternal and indefinite.51 A sempiternal, indefinite mode 
(e.  g., a pervasive, universal feature of enduring reality, or the entire transitive 
series of finite things) is literally a way that substance’s sempiternal, indefinite 
formal reality is modified. But it also seems that a temporally limited and finite 
mode is also literally a way that substance’s formal reality is modified. If sub-
stance’s formal reality is thought of as an enduring substratum, then a tempo-
rally limited, finite thing is literally a modification of some finite portion of that 
enduring substratum.
On this proposal, the sempiternal, indefinite substance’s immanent causa-
tion of its indefinite, sempiternal modes is intelligible. It seems its causation of 
finite, enduring things is also intelligible, given the intelligibility of indefinite-in-
definite causation: an indefinite, sempiternal substance could cause the indefi-
nite, sempiternal mode that is the entire series of finite, enduring things (where 
such causation might involve the causation of the pervasive, universal features 
described by laws of nature). Yet this proposal does require that God not be con-
ceived as (timelessly) eternal and infinite (and not indefinite), and more than a 
50 Cf. Curley 1969 and 1988.
51 Some discussions of Spinoza’s monism have something like this in mind: e.  g., Schaffer 2010 
(cf. Campbell 1990. For discussion of Schaffer, see Schmaltz 2019, ch. 7). On my proposal, par-
ticular finite, enduring bodies (minds) could be thought of as modes of an enduring extended 
(thinking) substratum. However, such an enduring substratum is not substance.
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few scholars have thought that a sempiternal, indefinite conception of God is in 
tension with the text of the Ethics.52
Another option for those wishing to retain the straightforward understand-
ing of modes and substance is the following: infinite, eternal formal reality and 
non-infinite, non-eternal formal reality are both ways that a generic formal reality 
or existence is. One way of being something rather than nothing is to be eternal 
and infinite, to be an eternal, non-finite entity that neither limits the reality of 
other things nor is limited by the reality of anything else (see E1def2). Another 
way of being something rather than nothing is to be non-eternal (enduring) and 
non-infinite (whether finite or indefinite).
This option also involves giving up on thinking of substance’s formal reality 
as infinite and eternal, since being infinite and being eternal are, on this view, 
merely ways substance is; substance’s reality is not itself infinite and eternal. This 
is certainly a monist view, but I am not sure it is Spinoza’s: Spinoza argues that 
substance’s reality is itself eternal and infinite. Moreover, one could worry that to 
think of substance’s reality as some generic formal reality is to think of it in objec-
tionably confused terms (e.  g., as a being, thing, or something. E2p40s1).
4  Looking Ahead
Leibniz identified what looks like a big problem at the center of Spinoza’s system. 
Spinoza says that God, the one and only substance that is infinite and eternal, is 
the cause of all things, but Spinoza also seems to suggest that the things in E1p28 
cannot be caused by what is infinite and eternal. As I described at the begin-
ning of the paper, commentators have sought to save Spinoza from the charge of 
incoherence by showing how the things of E1p28 are indeed caused by God. To 
explain how these finite, enduring things are caused by God, commentators tend 
to invoke something sempiternal and indefinite.
Above I argued that an eternal, infinite substance’s immanent causation of 
something sempiternal and indefinite involves an inexplicable shift in realities 
that renders the causation (and inherence of the effect in the cause) unintelli-
gible. If Spinoza rules out inter-attribute causation on the grounds that inter-at-
tribute causation would involve an inexplicable shift in realities from cause to 
effect, then it seems he should also rule out eternal-durational, infinite-indefinite 
causation as well. But if the infinite, eternal substance cannot have sempiternal, 
52 E.g., Hardin 1978, Steinberg 1981, Nadler 2006, and Schmaltz 2015.
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indefinite effects, then we are once again faced with the old Leibnizian charge: it 
seems that despite Spinoza’s assurances, it turns out that Spinoza’s God cannot 
be the cause of all things after all.
But I will not be concluding that Leibniz has, in the end, triumphed: there 
is an interpretation of Spinoza’s system on which God is still the cause of all 
things, even if there is no causal link between the infinite, eternal substance 
and enduring, striving things. I will defend this interpretation more in the com-
panion essay.
In brief, I will propose that Spinoza’s system is structured by two intersect-
ing causal-explanatory barriers. The first is the much-discussed barrier between 
attributes: bodies are only caused by bodies and minds by minds. This barrier is 
obviously a response to Descartes’ system: Spinoza deemed Cartesian mind-body 
causation unintelligible and sought to develop a more intelligible alternative. 
According to Spinoza, what is thinking only causes (and is caused by) what is 
thinking and what is extended only causes (and is caused by) what is extended, 
but one and the same thing can be conceived either as a thinking mind or as an 
extended body.
The second barrier is between infinite, eternal formal reality and non-in-
finite, enduring formal reality: the former does not cause the latter. The institu-
tion of this barrier can be understood as a critical response to the thesis that an 
infinite and eternal God creates and conserves the very being of finite things over 
time, a thesis about God’s activity secundum esse found in Cartesianism and in 
many other theistic systems.53 Spinoza deemed this widespread thesis unintel-
ligible and again sought to develop a more intelligible alternative. There is no 
eternal-durational causation, but one and the same thing  – one and the same 
essence – can be conceived either as enjoying timelessly eternal, infinite formal 
reality or as enjoying non-eternal, enduring, and finite (or, in some cases, indef-
inite) formal reality.54 Insofar as the essence is conceived as enjoying enduring 
reality, it is something whose very being cannot be immanently caused by an 
eternal and infinite substance. Insofar as the essence is conceived as enjoying 
eternal and infinite reality, however, it is something sustained in its very being 
53 Most early modern European philosophers held that God was a sustaining cause of the very 
being of things, a causa secundum esse. God does not just bring things into being, but continu-
ously acts to sustain thing in their being: in the absence of this sustaining causal activity, crea-
tures simply cease to have any reality or being (esse).
54 I also understand the one-and-the-sameness of a mind and body to be the one-and-the-same-
ness of an essence: one and the same essence can be conceived as enjoying either reality in 
thought or reality in extension. See the companion piece for more discussion.
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as a mode of an eternal and infinite substance.55 All things, conceived sub specie 
aeternitatis, are literally ways that substance’s eternal and infinite reality is.56
The observation that in Spinoza’s system, a thing can be conceived as actual 
in two ways, one of which involves conceiving things in and caused by the eternal 
and infinite substance, is not new. Spinoza seems to say as much himself. In a 
passage I take to hearken back to the distinction between formal realities (and 
correspondingly distinct causal structures) and ideas thereof I argued is devel-
oped in E2p8–9, Spinoza writes,
We conceive things [e.  g., the body, which is under discussion in E5p29] as actual in two 
ways: either insofar as we conceive them to exist in relation to a certain time and place, or 
insofar as we conceive them to be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of the 
divine nature. But the things we conceive in this second way as true, or real, we conceive 
under a species of eternity, and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God. 
(E5p29s)57 
What is new is my account of how Spinoza could be responding to a common 
view of divine sustaining causation and my suggestion that conception sub specie 
aeternitatis and conception sub specie durationis might be more like conception 
under different attributes than has been appreciated.58
Although they are similar, there is an important disanalogy between con-
ception sub specie aeternitatis/sub specie durationis and conception under dif-
ferent attributes: substance can be adequately conceived either as an extended 
substance or as a thinking substance, but substance can only be adequately con-
55 Spinoza says that to the “essence of any thing belongs that which, being given, the thing is 
[NS: also] necessarily posited and which, being taken away, the thing is necessarily [NS: also] 
taken away; or that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and which can 
neither be nor be conceived without the thing.” (E2def2) I follow D. Garrett 2009, 286, in holding 
that an essence can be given, and a thing “posited,” in more than one way (although I disagree 
that when the (eternal) “formal essence” is given, the thing is posited as possible; on my view, 
it is posited as something actual – albeit actual as a mode enjoying infinite, eternal reality). In 
the companion essay, I say more about how I understand the “one and the sameness” of infinite, 
eternal modes and non-infinite, non-eternal things, as well as how the attribute dimension of 
one-and-the-sameness intersects with the formal reality dimension of one-and-the-sameness.
56 So, on this interpretation, we can retain the straightforward view of inherence of modes in 
substance as well as the idea that Spinozan substance is infinite and timelessly eternal (rather 
than indefinite and sempiternal or some more generic kind of existence). See Section 3.2 above.
57 There is textual evidence that the distinction in E5p29s refers back to the distinction between 
formal realities I discussed in Section 2: E5p29s cites E2p45, which cites E2p8c.
58 It is suggestive that Spinoza even calls eternity and duration “attributes” in the Cogitata meta-
physica (G I.244).
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ceived as something whose reality is infinite and eternal. On the reading I just 
sketched, it is only when a thing is conceived as infinite and eternal that it is a 
mode inhering in and immanently caused by the infinite, eternal substance; it 
is only when a thing is conceived as an infinite and eternal mode that its very 
being (esse) is explained. When a thing is conceived as a finite, enduring thing, 
its formal reality is not ultimately explicable, as it is not caused by the one and 
only substance. But then such formal reality is not real after all. What is real are 
the one and only substance and its modes. In other words, Spinoza ends up being 
a kind of acosmist who denies the world, or cosmos, of enduring, finite things but 
who still holds that there is a “world” of eternal, infinite modes in the eternal, 
infinite substance. 
In the companion piece, I spell out some more details and answer some objec-
tions. I will readily admit that the acosmist consequence may not be a welcome 
one.59
AT Descartes, Œuvres de Descartes. Eds. Ch. Adam/P. Tannery, 1964–74.  
‘AT VII.41  f.’ stands for volume VII, pages 41 to 42
CM Spinoza, Cogitata Metaphysica
E Spinoza, Ethics; ‘E1p15’ stands for Ethics, part one, proposition 15
Ep Spinoza, Letters
G Spinoza, Spinoza Opera (4 vols.). Ed. by C. Gebhardt. Heidelberg, 1972/[1925]
KV Spinoza, Short Treatise
PPC Spinoza, Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy
Bennett, J. 1984. A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics. Indianapolis.
Caird, J. 1883. Spinoza. London.
Campbell, K. 1990. Abstract Particulars. Oxford.
Curley, E. 1969. Spinoza’s Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation. Cambridge, MA. 
–. 1988. Behind the Geometrical Method: A Reading of Spinoza’s Ethics. Princeton.
59 For their helpful comments on drafts and/or conversation on this material, I would like to 
thank Lilli Alanen, Janet Broughton, John Carriero, Tim Clarke, Tim Crockett, Michael Della Rocca, 
Catherine Flynn, Dan Garber, Colin Garretson, Don Garrett, Hannah Ginsborg, Sean Greenberg, 
John Grey, Karolina Hübner, Raphael Krut-Landau, Martin Lin, Colin Marshall, Yitzhak Melamed, 
David Nowakowski, Alison Peterman, Tad Schmaltz, Justin Vlasits, Daniel Warren, and Andy 
Younan. I would also like to thank students in my graduate seminars at Berkeley and audiences 
at UC Irvine, UCLA, the University of Mississippi, Mississippi State University, Simon Fraser Uni-
versity, and Stanford University. Most of all, I want to express my deep gratitude to the extraordi-
narily thoughtful and incisive anonymous referees.
 Spinoza’s Monism I: Ruling Out Eternal-Durational Causation   23
–. 1990. “Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece (II); The TTP as a Prolegomenon to the Ethics.”  
In Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. by J. A. Cover/M. Kulstad.
Delahunty, R. J. 1985. Spinoza. London. 
Della Rocca, M. 1996. Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza. Oxford.
–. 2008a. “Rationalism Run Amok: Representation and the Reality of the Emotions in 
Spinoza.” In Interpreting Spinoza. Ed. by Ch. Huenemann. Cambridge, 26–52.
–. 2008b. Spinoza. New York.
–. 2012. “Rationalism, Idealism, Monism, and Beyond.” In Spinoza and German Idealism.  
Ed. by E. Forster/Y. Melamed. Cambridge, 7–26.
Descartes, R. 1964–74. Œuvres de Descartes. Ed. by Ch. Adam/P. Tannery, 12 vols. Paris.
Donagan, A. 1988. Spinoza. Chicago.
Friedman, J. 1986. “How the Finite Follows from the Infinite in Spinoza’s Metaphysical System.” 
Synthese 69(3), 371–407.
Garber, D. 2015. “Superheroes in the History of Philosophy: Spinoza, Super-Rationalist.” 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 53(3), 507–21.
Garrett, A. 2003. Meaning in Spinoza’s Method. Cambridge.
Garrett, D. 1991. “Spinoza’s Necessitarianism.” In God and Nature in Spinoza’s Metaphysics. 
Ed. by Y. Yovel. Leiden, 191–218.
–. 2009. “Spinoza on the Essence of the Human Body and the Part of the Mind that is 
Eternal.” In Cambridge Companion to Spinoza’s Ethics. Ed. by O. Koistinen. Cambridge, 
284–302.
–. 2017. “The Puzzle of Misrepresentation and Error in Spinoza’s Philosophy of Mind.”  
In The Oxford Handbook of Spinoza. Ed. by M. Della Rocca. Oxford.
Grey, J. (2014). “Spinoza on Composition, Causation, and the Mind’s Eternity.” British Journal 
for the History of Philosophy 22(3), 446–67.
Gueroult, M. 1974/[1968]. Spinoza, 2 vols. Paris.
Hardin, C. L. 1978. “Spinoza on Immortality and Time.” In Spinoza: New Perspectives.  
Ed. by R. W. Shahan/J. I. Biro. Norman, 129–38.
Hübner, K. 2017. “The Trouble with Feelings, or Spinoza on the Identity of Power and Essence.” 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 55(1), 35–53.
–. 2019. “Spinoza on Intentionality, Materialism, and Mind-body Relations.” Philosophers’ 
Imprint 43, 1–23.
Jarrett, C. 2001. “Spinoza’s Distinction between Essence and Existence.” Iyyun: The Jerusalem 
Philosophical Quarterly 50, 245–52. 
Laerke, M. 2017. “Aspects of Spinoza’s Theory of Essence.” In The Actual and The Possible.  
Ed. by M. Sinclair. Oxford.
–. 2017. “Leibniz’s Encounter with Spinoza’s Monism, October 1675 to February 1678.”  
In The Oxford Handbook of Spinoza. M. Della Rocca (ed.). Oxford.
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